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COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS
this law unconstitutional, not on the grounds or cruel or unusual pun-
ishment, but as violating the 14th amendment, which says "that no
State . . . . shall deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." In this case the Court further declares,
"The operation upon feeble-minded is in no sense in the nature of a
penalty, and therefore whether it is an unusual and cruel punishment
is not involved."
In Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N. J. Law 48, the Board of
examiners created by act to authorize and provide for the sterilization
of feeble-minded, epileptics, certain criminals and other defectives,
ordered that the operation of salpingectomy be performed upon one
Alice Smith, an epileptic inmate of a State institution. Although this
order was reversed the Court made clear that it was not upon the
grounds of cruel and unusual punishment but rather because the statute
in question was based upon a classification that bore no reasonable
relation to the object of such police regulations and hence violated the
14th amendment.
In Davis v. Berry (D. C.) 216 F. 413, an act required the perform-
ance of an operation on criminals who had been convicted of a felony.
This act was within the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,
but it in no way referred to feeble-minded persons. Similarly a like act
in Mickle v. Henrich (D. C.) 262, F. 687, applying only to persons
convicted of rape, and a like act in State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, refer-
ring to criminals only, were both found to come under this prohibition.
It is plainly apparent in these cases that the constitutional inhibition
against cruel and unusual punishment has no applicaiton to the surgi-
cal treatment of feeble-minded persons. W. J. P.
State ex. rel. Neill v. Nutter, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia, May 12, 1925.
TRIAL - VERDICT. - Verdict returned in correct form and
signed by foreman is not affected by statement of juror upon poll that
he agreed thereto to get the jury together.
Suit by the State on the relation of Clyde H. Neill for mandamus
to be directed to Trebey Nutter, Special Judge of the Circuit Court of
Marion County. The jury having agreed to a verdict in the jury room,
returned it to the court in correct form and properly signed by the
foreman. Upon being polled three of the jurors stated that the verdict
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was agreed to only upon compromise and that it was not exactly their
verdict. The court then had the jury to return to its room to further
consider the verdict. After a while it returned to the court room and
again delivered to the clerk a verdict signed by the foreman finding
the defendant not guilty. Upon again being polled two of the jurors
reiterated that the verdict was not their real opinion but that they had
agreed to the verdict only to get the jury together. The court then
overruled defendant's motion to accept and record the verdict and
adjourned court to the following day. Upon return of the jury on
the following day, the court of its own motion directed the jury to
be polled on the verdict. On that poll ten jurors answered "yes" and
two jurors answered "no." Thereupon the court refused to receive
the verdict and discharged the jury. The defendant excepted and ob-
tained from the court an alternative writ of mandamus, requiring the
special judge to accept and record the verdict or show cause why he
should not do so.
Held: Where the jury, having agreed to a verdict in the jury
room, returned it to the court in correct form, and properly signed by
the foreman, the finality of the verdict is not affected by the statement
of a juror upon a poll of the jury that he had agreed to the verdict in
the jury room merely "to get the jury together" when he further
stated, "It is my verdict on a compromise."
The authorities are about equally divided on the law applicable to
these facts, and cases may be found supporting either point of view.
In Frick v. Reynolds, 6 Okla. 638, a very similar question of law was
decided contra to the above case. Here, upon the polling of the jury
one of the jurors answered that he consented to the verdict in order
to prevent the hanging of the jury, but that he was not satisfied with
it. It was held that it was erroneous to overrule a motion that the
jury be returned to their room for further deliberations. Likewise in
Ostrander v. City of Lansing, 111 Mich. 693, it was held that if a
juror, upon the jury's being polled, makes a response which implies
that the verdict does not embody the result of his own investigation
and best judgment, the verdict should not be received. So held, where
a juror, in answer to the question, "Is this your verdict?" responded,
"Compromise verdict." The same question was again decided with
like results in Rothbauer v. The State, 22 Wis. 468. In this case it was
held error to receive (against objection) a verdict of guilty in a crim-
inal action, where one of the jurors declares, upon the jury being
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polled, that he assented to the verdict for the sake of an agreement,
but does not regard it as correct.
Notwithstanding the above and many other decisions of like hold-
ing the best reason seems to be with the holding in the instant case.
In Profatt on Jury Trials, Sec. 462, it is said, "Where some of the jury
disagree to the verdict after it is announced, it will nevertheless be
sustained if they subsequently agree to it." And again we find in
38 Cyc. 1875, "A verdict is not vitiated by the fact that a juror hesi-
tated to agree to it, or where, in answer to the inquiry, he said that it
is not his verdict but that he consented to it, and subsequently answers
that it is his verdict, or says he consented to it under protest."
The court in the instant case holds that the statement of each
reluctant juror, upon the second return of the jury into court, that
the verdict was then his verdict on a compromise, made the verdict
unanimous, and gave to it such finality that the trial court should have
then and there received it and recorded it. The opinion in Scholfield
Gear and Pulley Co. v. Scholtield, 71 Conn. 1, is particularly applica-
ble to the findings in the present case. The court said, "Verdicts are
often and properly the result of mutual concessions. Without some-
thing of this kind, twelve men can hardly be expected to come to a
unanimous conclusion upon any computation of unliquidated damages
in an action of tort. For the purpose of reaching an agreement jurors,
while they cannot rightfully go contrary to their own convictions, pay
great regard to the opinions of their fellows. If the verdict in the
plaintiff's favor was reached by a compromise this, of itself, would be
no reason for refusing to accept it."
Another case strongly in point is that of McCoy v. Jordan, 184
Mass. 575. Here the court held, "Where the jury, by their foreman,
had signed the verdict, and it was affirmed, all the jurors assenting
thereto, although one said that he did it under protest, the court prop-
erly refused to change the record and treat the result as a disagree-
ment, although the language of a paper accompanying an affidavit of a
protesting juror and his conduct at the time the jury was polled indi-
cated that he dissented from the verdict."
In Wyley v. Bull, 41 Kan. 206, a like result was reached. After
the jury had returned their verdict to the court they were polled and
each juror with one exception answered that the verdict returned was
his verdict, and that juror, a Mr. Chaplin, at first answered that he
"consented to it under protest" and again he answered, "I did consent
under protest." The court then said to the juror, "Mr. Chaplin, is this
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your verdict?" And the juror answered, "It is, but I consented to it
under protest." The court then recorded the verdict and discharged
the jury. W. J. P.
EVIDENCE.
Werner v. Pope, 273 S. W. 92 (Ky. App., 1925).
EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL NOTICE - AUTOMOBILES
Plaintiff, driving an automobile, struck defendant at a crossing and
injured him. A witness testified that plaintiff stopped within three
or four feet after hitting defendant. Defendant excepted to the fail-
ure of the court to instruct the jury that it was plaintiff's duty to
drive at a reasonable rate of speed. Held, such instruction was un-
necessary, as there was no evidence tending to show excessive speed.
The court took judicial notice of the fact, as a matter of common
knowledge, that an automobile cannot ordinarily be operated at a
street comer or elsewhere at a much lower rate of speed than such
as will permit its being stopped within three or four feet. This illus-
trates the tendency of the courts to take judicial notice of many facts
in the construction and operation of the automobile.
Courts have heretofore taken judicial notice of the fact that appli-
cation of the brakes or shutting off the power are usual means of
stopping an automobile, in determining the driver's duty under cer-
tain circumstances (Waking v. Cincinnati 1. & W. R. Co., 72 Ind.
App. 401, 125 N. E. 799) of the fact that snow will gather on the wind-
shield of an automobile being driven during a snowstorm, and that
little progress would be made if it were attempted to keep the wind-
shield entirely clear (Dube v. Sevigne [N. H.] 123 A. 894), of the
fact that the driver of a Ford car is seated three or four feet to the
rear of the radiator and front wheels, in determining whether plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence in stopping with the front of his
car on the railroad track, where he could not see the train approaching
until within three or four feet of the track (Wallen v. Mississippi River
& B. T. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.), 267 S. W. 12), of the fact that economy
in gasoline consumption is largely influenced by the ability and ex-
perience of the chauffeur, the character of the road, the number and
length of stops, etc., in an action for breach of a mileage warranty
(Fleming v. Gerlinger Motorcar Co. et al., 86 Ore. 195, 168 P. 289),
of the fact that the occurrence of a blow-out in the tire of a running
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